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According to Joseph Nye, who coined the concept of ‘soft power’, Putin ‘failed to 
capitalize on the soft-power boost afforded to Russia by hosting the 2014 Winter 
Olympic Games in Sochi’ (Nye, 2014). With political volatility in the region throughout 
the year, Russia’s ensuing actions - culminating in the secession of Crimea - and its 
position over the armed conflict in Ukraine, certainly appear to bear this out. The Sochi 
Olympics were predominantly framed by the Western press as a Russian soft power quest 
and an attempt to obtain belated recognition as a great power. However, Sochi should be 
understood as a part of a wider package of “spatial governance” undertaken by Putin’s 
regime. We argue that the Sochi mega-event is part of a wider soft power strategy - one 
which is not the same as, for example, the UK’s or Brazil’s use of such events. For 
Russia, international status means possessing both soft and hard power resources and 
being able to use them. 
Key words: Soft power; Russia; Sports mega-events; Sochi Olympics; national 
identity. 
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Introduction 
The intention in what follows is to outline how and why Russia’s “soft power” 
strategy does not follow a similar trajectory to, nor is it the same as, other states who have 
drawn upon sports mega-events to showcase their nations. Commentators are quick to 
lump together BRIC countries as the new wave of mega-event hosts, yet the strategies 
adopted by each and the goals they seek to reach differ greatly (see Black, 2008; 
Baviskar, 2014; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). This is nowhere more evident than in 
the case of Russia. As this paper shows, the common denominators of status-seeking, 
externally-focused, image-improving strategies employed by the vast majority of sports 
mega-evens hosts cannot be simply extrapolated to Russia’s case. 
The paper proceeds as follows: first we he case of Russia. As this paper shows, 
the couture on soft power and sports mega-events before turning to the Western-centric 
“framing” of Russia’s actions in particular in relation to the Sochi Winter Olympics in 
2014. We then analyse the Kremlin’s soft power agenda based on the official political 
discourse and the messages transmitted in the run-up and throughout the course of the 
Olympic Games. The next section puts forward the idea that the hosting of the Sochi 
Games and the annexation of Crimea were mutually reinforcing events towards laying the 
foundations of an emergent new viable national identity, rather than claims for Russia’s  
“great power” status. We suggest, therefore, that the Russian soft power project targets 
primarily a domestic audience, which represents a stark contrast to the soft power agenda 
of developed and other “emerging” nations and previous sports mega-events hosts. 
Finally, we sketch out the contours of Russia’s soft power strategy in view of the 
repercussions of the Ukrainian conflict. 
 
Mega-events: theoretical approach  
Interestingly, the study of the political use of sport and sports mega-events has, 
paradoxically perhaps, not been carried out in the main by political scientists and 
international relations scholars, but rather by sociologists, historians and ‘sports studies’ 
scholars alike (Giulianotti, 2015; Persson and Petersson, 2014; Muller, 2014; Almeida et 
al, 2013).  While this is changing slowly, key concepts deriving from the former 
academic disciplines are making their way into sports studies. One such concept, “soft 
power”, has been discussed widely in international relations and is increasingly being 
used by scholars interested in sport and sport diplomacy (Finlay and Xin, 2010; Mangan, 
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2012; Manzenreiter, 2010; Courmont 2013; authors, 2013; Brannagan and Guilianotti, 
2014). Simply put, soft power is – for Joseph Nye, who coined it in 1990 – what states 
ought to seek to use given the changing nature of international relations after the end of 
the Cold War, and the risk attached to deploying traditional military forms of power 
(traditionally termed oft power is t Such soft power is made up of ‘intangible power 
resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions’ and is clearly becoming more 
important in inter-state relations (Nye, 1990, 167). We have discussed the concept at 
length elsewhere (authors, 2013; 2014; 2015) so will only offer a cursory introduction 
here. Nye distinguishes between the power to sources such as culture, ideology, and 
institutions’ and is clearly becoming more important in inter-state relations (Nye, 1990, 
167). We have discussed the concept at length elsewhere (authors, 2013; 2014; 2015) so 
will only offer a cursory introduction here. Nye distinguishes between the power to 
‘influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants’ (coercive power) and the 
ability to ‘attract and co-opt them to want what you want’ (soft power) (2004, 2). As 
authors (2013, 6) suggest: 
 
…the ideational dimension to soft power is key and is found in the ability of 
states to communicate universally shared values (such as, we argue, those 
rooted in international sporting competition) in order to court the publics of 
other states. Used in this way, soft power is a discursive mechanism for 
increased agency in global affairs through the performative politics of 
attraction rather than the use (or threat of use) of military or economic force. 
In this sense soft power resides in the ability to shape the preferences of 
others and align those preferences to your own. 
 
Interestingly for the current discussion is the fact that it was Nye who recently 
suggested that the Russian President Putin “failed to capitalize on the soft-power boost 
afforded to Russia by hosting the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi” (Nye, 2014). 
With the political volatility in the region throughout the year, Russia’s ensuing actions - 
culminating in the secession of Crimea - and its position over the armed conflict in 
Ukraine, certainly appear to bear this out. This article sets out why Nye and others are 
mistaken in their assessment of Russia’s soft power strategy. The simple answer, as we 
show, is that viewing and framing the Sochi Olympics as a Russian attempt to obtain 
belated recognition as a great power is to misunderstand the Games and their meaning for 
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Russia. This chimes with the  popular view that elite sport and mega-events in particular, 
perpetuate and legitimatize Western civilisational standards and could be viewed as a 
variation of ‘soft cultural colonisation’. As Horton and Saunders put it, “the founding of 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1894 could be said to represent the formal 
institutionalisation of the Western imperialist model of sport and its associated discourse 
which, largely, still holds sway today” (2011, 890).  
Therefore seen thus, emerging states, including the BRICS countries, attempting 
to wield soft power through hosting the Olympic Games only stand a chance of success to 
the extent that their modernities are consistent with a neo-liberal paradigm of 
development. This is, first of all, due to the fact, that irrespective of the hosts’ best effort, 
a critical Western media framing often prevails, unearthing all the deficiencies of the 
hosts’ political system and social order, epitomized in the event preparation process 
(Manzenreiter, 2010). With a mega-event serving as a magnifying glass, highlighting 
cultural positive but also unwelcome truths, developing countries often fail to receive 
universal acclaim for their alternative modernities (Horton and Saunders, 2011; Mangan, 
2012). On the other hand, it raises a question about the tenacity of the hegemonic 
worldview of the Western media, which self-righteously passes an exclusive sentence 
without due regard for other possible audiences (Finlay and Xin, 2010). The argument is 
that the emerging states’ soft power projects may be more selective, primarily directed at 
other states with comparable political economies and levels of development, or at states 
within their region (rather than being designed to embrace the world at large). Brazil is a 
case in point, as it sets out to secure its position as the leading regional actor in Latin 
America as well as becoming a global actor (authors, 2014). In this respect, and taking 
into account the global reach of the messages transmitted via sports mega-events, the 
international objective of developing nations may be twofold: to appeal to the one group 
of states, thereby wielding soft power (authors, 2013), while emphatically and assertively 
informing the others of their intentions. Russia’s great power claims, for example, 
persisting for some time and gaining currency during the Olympics, with little universal 
attraction potential to them, were rather intended to inform the West of its coveted place 
in the global political hierarchy. On the other hand, there is a growing reckoning that 
Western understanding of liberalism and democracy is unlikely to find traction in some 
nation-states and that Russia is not only one such state, but it is also a ‘resister state’ 
(Lankina and Niemczyk, 2014) with its own distinctive and (potentially) endearing values 
and leadership style, if not institutions (Pu and Sweller 2014). 
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Great powers, or in Russia’s case, an aspiring great power, traditionally 
prioritized domestic audiences through such ambitious projects rather than specifically 
“signalling” to foreign publics.  As Pu and Sweller state (2014, 145): 
 
“For rapidly ascending states, in particular, the domestic audience usually 
trumps the international one […] Because the continued rise of emerging 
powers is rarely a given, the process of rapid development usually generates 
generous social and political dislocations, and future growth and internal 
stability often require fundamental political reforms.  
 
It could be argued, therefore, that the Sochi Olympics were designed above all as 
a source of domestic soft power rather than simply an external “signalling” exercise. 
Such a strategy is not dissimilar to Beijing which also pursued a politics of “two level 
games” (Putnam, 1988). Putnam’s phrase refers to the intertwined nature of both 
international and domestic politics and leads to a more nuanced understanding of soft 
power rather than seeing it simply as an instrumental status marker in the same vein as, 
for example, attempting to gain “membership in elite clubs, such as the Group of 8 (G8), 
permanent membership in the UNSC, [and] leadership positions in international 
organizations” (Welch et al. 2014,10). 
It could, therefore, be further suggested that the main objective of the Russian soft 
power project is to instigate a sense of self-worth, patriotism and to cultivate a viable 
national idea (see Courmont, 2013, for parallels with China). While sport has always 
been a major tool of “collective identification” (Jackson and Haigh, 2008), providing a 
strong impetus for national identity construction and stimulating ardent nationalistic 
sentiments, it has been cunningly used by regimes in the past to strengthen the national 
idea and even infuse it with a new vigour on the eve of conflict. The war-like rhetoric 
prevalent in the framing of the Sochi Olympics in Russia (Sperling, 2003). Thus, the 
Sochi Olympics were promoted by the Putin government, and this view was eagerly 
embraced by a large section of the population, as an ongoing war between the West and 
Russia, which was only strengthened by the belligerent media framing assumed in the 
West. As a result, the 2014 Winter Olympics served a double purpose, entrusted to them 
by the ruling elite, to ignite a patriotic sentiment and to be perceived as a unifying 
cultural symbol, compared to World War II in the 20th century, laying the ground for the 
emergence of the potent new Russian myth (Persson & Petersson, 2014). Such historical 
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rhetoric prevalent in the framing of the Sochi Olympics that relate collectively shared 
moments of the development of a nation (authors, 2015). In this respect, Makarychev and 
Yatsyk (2014) also draw parallels between the Sochi 2014 Games and the annexation of 
Crimea based on their contribution to what is considered by Putin to be a great power 
status. These two events served as a force of “domestic consolidation” behind Putin’s 
aims and a trigger for domestic soft power; that is, the attempt to influence a domestic 
audience by providing them with a growing sense of Russian national narrative. 
Mass opinion polls conducted in Russia in 2014-2014 can be eloquent illustrations 
of this trend. According to the Russian news agency Novosti, the post-Sochi period led to 
the unprecedented popularity of Putin at home, with him polling an all-time high of 85,9 
per cent in May 2014. In 2015 around 46 per cent of respondents believe that the Sochi 
Olympics led to the improvement of Russia’s international prestige, with 36 per cent 
convinced of its positive role in the rise of patriotic sentiment (WCIOM 2015). 
The Sochi Olympics and an Alternative Interpretation of Soft Power 
Rather than understanding Sochi as a stepping-stone en route to ‘emerging’ as a 
power, Russia viewed the Olympics first and foremost as a belated recognition of its 
equitable status or ‘growing agency’ in the global order (Muller, 2014) or as Putin more 
diplomatically put it ‘an assessment of our country’ (Alekseyeva, 2014). According to the 
majority of scholars (Persson & Petersson, 2014; Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2013), the 
primary objective of the ruling elite was to validate Russia’s claims for the re-
establishment of national greatness and underscore the continuity of its indispensability in 
world affairs through the hosting of the Winter Olympics 2014. Alekseyeva has labelled 
the Games ‘Putin’s government’s brand of modernisation’ (p.160). This argument is 
substantiated by other grand projects throughout the country, such as the reconstruction 
of Vladivostok for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit ($20bn), Universiade 
Games 2013 in Kazan ($6.9bn), Skolkovo innovation centre ($15.2bn), with an image-
building apex in shape of the 2018 FIFA World Cup (Alekseyeva, 2014). Golubchikov 
(2015) rightly points to Sochi as simply a part of a much wider strategy of ‘spatial 
governance’ and warns against ‘reductionist’ accounts of the use of this SME as a signal 
of Russia’s growing power (to an international and domestic audience). He goes on to 
suggest that the Russian ‘government’s key rationales with regard to the regional and 
urban development are conspicuously underplayed’ (2015, 2). This latter point is 
significant, because it means that Sochi cannot be understood in isolation, as the massive 
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regional and urban re-development projects throughout Russia provide the context in 
which the Olympics were built and took place.  
 
Such a modernisation programme is not without its problems. For example, it is a 
rather piecemeal process which takes place in fits and starts, largely at the expense of 
other more urgent socially-oriented projects and accompanied by omnipresent corruption. 
Orttung and Zheuchov (2013) went as far as to pigeonhole mega-events as an emblematic 
feature of Russia’s political economy, which officially justifies and almost legalises 
embezzlement and money laundering. Yet as long as the results are internationally visible 
and conspicuous enough the government considers the symbolic target to have been 
reached with no major deviations from their plan (Tsygankov, 2006). 
 
Rebuffing criticism of the Sochi Olympic Games being a piecemeal, money 
laundering affair, Russian sources emphasize the long term strategic interest in the region 
and refer to the multibillion dollar investments in both eco-cultural and infrastructural 
revival of the region. As Kosachev (2014) puts it: 
 
Sochi is not ‘Khalif an hour’ but a serious long term investment, which has 
potential after the Olympics. 
 
Investments into sustainable eco-development and restoration of the damaged eco 
system ($95 mn), construction of sewage systems and waste recycle plants ($300mn), and 
development of energy generation system ($1,75bn) are among current ambitious post-
Olympic projects (gorchakovfund.ru)1. This ties in with Golubchikov’s point above about 
Sochi being a part of a wider strategic urban and regional development project. 
 
Currently, the success of the Olympic project is exemplified by the inflow of 
tourists to Sochi in the first post-Olympic summer, totaling 85 per cent of the hotel 
capacity. This, however, may be attributed not so much to the marketing success of the 
city as to the international sanctions, depreciating currency and, thus, limited capacity of 
the population to travel abroad. Some studies (Sakwa, 2011) have also drawn attention to 
                                                 
1 ‘Anton Bredichin: Post Olimpijskij Sochi- Novue Gorizontu Razvitija’ [Anton Bredichin: Post-Olympic Sochi – New Horizons of 
Development], Gorchakov Fund, 16 December 2014, http://gorchakovfund.ru/news/13375/ . 
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the decisive elements of continuity between ‘Putinism’ and the political and ideological 
the political and ideological tradition of the Soviet Union, epitomised among other things 
by mega-projects, where neither money, nor any other rational considerations except 
national pride and awe-inspiring gigantism were ever taken into account. There are two 
established traditional approaches to framing of the Olympic Games hosted by the non-
Western peripheral states. The Olympics are either characterised as a ‘coming-out party’ 
of an emerging state and appraised in terms of a ‘graduation into the community of 
civilised nations’ (Seoul 1988, Mexico City 1968; Black, 2004; Cho and Bairner, 2011; 
Mangan, 2012), or assessed as the final rehabilitation benchmark of ‘nations that have 
done their penance for breaking away from the norms shared by core states’ (Munich 
1972, Tokyo 1964; Finlay and Xin, 2010, p.879; Tagsold, 2010; Kietlinski, 2011). 
 
While democratic nation-states with troubled pasts appear to use SMEs to 
dissociate themselves from their histories (Germany, Japan, Italy), non-liberal states with 
communist legacies in particular are comfortable with alluding to what they want to see 
as nation-defining, though contested, historical periods, often with nostalgic sentiment 
(for example, China and Russia) (Persson and Petersson, 2014). In this respect, in a 
‘rehabilitated’ state a definitive de-monumentalisation process takes place (Schrag, 
2009), evident both in the emerging architectural tradition and in the placatory 
presentation of its culture, with a tendency to omit, wherever possible, mentioning or 
detailed elaboration of some historic periods or diminish their significance within 
national identity. Non-liberal states, on the contrary, appear to increasingly draw 
inspiration from a menacing and overbearing interpretation of their historic and cultural 
paths, emblematic in grandiose mega-events designated architecture, meant to invoke 
‘glory and power’. 
 
Orttung and Zhemukhov (2013) compare the rationale behind the Sochi Olympics 
to those of the Tokyo Games in 1964, which marked the return of Japan to the world 
stage and which were perceived as an official declaration of its rehabilitation and 
acceptance into the international community after World War II. This comparison is 
highly misleading, though, due to the presence of more apparent differences than 
similarities between these two cases. The Sochi Olympics were the first global Russian 
coming out party after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, consequently, a 
symbolic defeat in the Cold War. An event, indeed, comparable in significance for 
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Russian self-identification to the 1964 Tokyo and 1972 Munich Olympics for Japan and 
Germany respectively, marking a return of former axis powers to the group of civilized 
nations. Russia’s reception, however, was not a repetition of Tokyo’s open-armed 
welcome back in 1964. Two things were decidedly different: first, Japan was endorsed by 
the USA at the time in return for a full-hearted acceptance of democratic values and a 
repudiation of revisionist sentiments.  Russia, on the other hand, decided to 
conspicuously ‘re-emerge’ on its own terms. While Japan badly longed for recognition, 
Russia appears intent to reaffirm its international standing and receive acknowledgment 
of legitimacy of its newer-relinquished geopolitical and civilizational ambitions 
(Tsygankov, 2009; Welch et al, 2010). Japan openly sided with the USA and remains its 
loyal ally to this day (Lam, 2007); however, making long-term friends does not  seem to 
be among Russia’s chief aims, although its omnipresent soft-power rhetoric might give an 
impression to a casual observer of the obvious adherence to the politics of attraction 
(Tsygankov, 2006; Laruelle, 2012). The Tokyo Games were largely a USA project, - 
inasmuch as they were thoroughly overseen by the USA and should have exemplified the 
uncontested success of the American model. In fact, they turned out to be one of the 
crucial affirmation of American preponderance as ‘a society worthy of admiration and 
deserving emulation’ (Brzezinski, 1998, p.8) 
Russia’s ruthless image-building crusade, on the contrary, only makes it appear a 
wolf in sheep’s clothing, or a burly Siberian bear, intimidating the West and resurrecting 
its most mortal unconscious fears, which date back to the days of the Cold War or even 
further back in time (Suslov, 2012; Sakwa, 2011). Deservedly so, because for Russia 
attractiveness has never meant being unassuming, forthcoming, cooperative or responsive 
to outer pressures. It has rather been equated with military potential, territorial 
superiority, technological advancement and dominance of its culture and language 
(Sperling, 2003), which is more reminiscent of hard power. Modern realities, however, 
challenge Russia to follow global trends to stay relevant and competitive, subscribing to 
soft power values seems to be one of them, and thus the prioritisation of mega-events 
which is part and parcel of soft power strategies, could not better conceal Russian true 
sentiments. Therefore, an assertion that through hosting the Winter Olympics 2014 
Russia was not seeking to demonstrate a certain ideology is only partially true, inasmuch 
as adherence to any ideology different to that of the dominant paradigm of neo-
liberalism, taking into account growing disillusionment with the Washington consensus 
in some parts of the world (Zhang, 2012), is already a very strong point to be made 
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especially when it comes from Russia or China. It might not be entirely clear or 
eloquently articulated even inside the country, due to the protracted ideological vacuum 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Welch et al, 2010; Suslov, 2012), though, it is 
obvious that the message that comes through is: ‘Russia is back and to be reckoned with’. 
International views 
Besides the facts directly connected to the mega-event, the international 
evaluation of the Sochi Olympics is by and large grounded on previous accounts of all 
events associated with Russia and its historical precursor - the Soviet Union. Indeed, 
Russia is not only a formal successor to the Soviet Union, it is also a successor to all 
pervasive cultural stereotypes of the Soviet era. The international community, stirred up 
by media framing and liberal governments’ wariness and offhand rejection of alternative 
routes of development, tends to draw from a set of long-engrained primitive stereotypes 
when forming its attitude to the still enigmatic Russia (Sakwa, 2011, Tsygankov, 2009), 
discarding official information and visual images as propaganda. Interestingly enough, 
the futility of the recent Russian soft power endeavour may be traced back to what 
Brzezinski (1998) considers as one of the major reasons behind the Russian loss of 
influence in Eurasia and defeat in the Cold War. He sees the causes of Russian miseries 
in the somewhat alien nature of its cultural tradition to Western Europe and subsequent 
defiance of its growing cultural pre-eminence rooted in distorted and rather arrogant 
perception on the part of Western Europeans of Russia’s inferiority. Furthermore, 
Rothman (2011) sees the dissemination of liberal ideas and norms, as well as a lack of 
acceptance of the Soviet system and defiance of its legitimacy in the West, as the causes 
of the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union and communism. As a result, a global 
collective consciousness produces an image which is an amalgam of an official political 
discourse, clichés and occasional personal experience. The Russian government has 
evidently failed to trigger any fundamental changes in the dominant international image 
of the country (Nye, 2014)  due to the lack of coordinated effort or coherent uniform 
message and given the unprecedented cost of the Games (Marten, 2014). 
 
From the very moment the Winter Olympics 2014 were awarded to Russia in 
Guatemala in 2007 it was viewed by many as a dubious choice; first and foremost, 
because a historically unstable and recently war-ravaged region was selected as a location 
(Persson & Petersson, 2014). The image of the future Games was further exacerbated by 
Russia’s deteriorating relations with the USA and the EU triggered both by discord over 
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Russia’s domestic policies, such as treatment of the opposition or civil rights issues 
(Alekseyeva, 2014), as well as international publics’ indignation over war in Georgia in 
2008. To top it all, the persecution and suppression of the LGBT community and the 
unresolved conflict with Circassian diaspora also found traction in the West further 
tarnishing the Games and dissolving the prospects of any soft power benefits for the 
country (Muller, 2014). The image of the future Games was further exacerbated by 
Russia Russiat was viewed by many as a dubious choice; first and foremost, because a 
historically unstable and recently war-ravaged region was selecten or civil rights issues 
Scrupulous coverage of the internal discontent severely threatened the official meta-
narrative behind the Games, which portrayed Russia not only as a country growing 
conscious of its national strengths and with flagrant geopolitical ambitions, but also as a 
tolerant, inclusive and multicultural community where people enjoy religious and ethnic 
freedoms and live in full harmony. Persson (2014), however, maintains that Putin’s 
administration pursued an inherently different strategy; knowing that it will get bad 
publicity irrespective of its own actions, it strived to promote its counter narrative 
containing as much positive information as possible. The key to this strategy was to 
secure visibility and make an official view prevail through making an emphasis on 
quantity rather than quality of the messages. Still, the prevalence of ambitious statements 
over actual deeds in addition to the absence of fundamental institutional changes 
(Rutland, 2012) to the system cannot mask certain insincerity and deliberate hypocrisy of 
the ‘New Russia’ soft power narrative, which essentially has failed to win the hearts and 
minds of the international publics. A different view exists, however, that the 2014 Sochi 
Games becoming the most politicized sports mega-event in recent history, only testifies 
to the fact that 
 
the political fracas surrounding them is highlighting how Putin resurrected Russia 
from the darkest decade after the end of the Cold War and became the principal bête 
noire of Pax Americana (Chaulia, 2014). 
 
 
Crimean gambit - a ‘diversionary’ war or a ‘great power’ dream come true? 
There is a general incomprehension of the reasons behind the annexation of 
Crimea in the Western media and among academics in view of the lack of any visible 
hard gains for Russia. The Crimean gambit, allegedly, turned out to be a smokescreen 
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that hid Olympic faults and streamlined triumphant great power rhetoric into a new geo-
political dimension. Instead of potentially taking the wind out of Putin’s great power 
ambitions, the political coup in Ukraine, taking place simultaneously with the Olympics 
in Russia, as if intentionally timed so, brought Russia a large swath of (historically) 
strategically coveted land. While this internationally condemned move, further 
exacerbated by the Kremlin’s stance on the Ukrainian issue, resulted in strict economic 
and political sanctions from the West, thus rendering any soft power in the traditional 
sense unattainable, it still fulfilled the most important goal on Putin’s (domestic) soft 
power agenda so far – namely it elevated national consciousness to unprecedented levels 
in post-Soviet history. By doing so the coup consolidated public support for Putin’s 
political persona, once again raising ‘demophily’, or the unconditional love of the 
Russian population (Fish, 2014). This ‘demophily’ marked his rule in the 2000s and 
visibly weakened by the turn of the decade, not least because of the unquenched 
corruption and money laundering, ubiquitously plaguing the Sochi 2014 project. Putin’s 
actions may seem clearly pointless, considering how bent he was on promoting Russia as 
a reliable international partner on security issues, as well as committed to peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and a guardian of inviolability of post-Cold War international 
political system. Yet, Fish (2014) sees all Putin’s internationally self-discrediting moves 
as a justified trade-off for his popularity at home, arguing that ‘the thrust into Ukraine 
seems to Putin to be the perfect mystique preserver’. 
 
Putin in 2014-2015, as noted by many commentators, bears little resemblance to 
the man of the 2000s. Nevertheless, speaking of what defines his values, beliefs, and the 
character of his decisions and, henceforth, the contours of modern Russian policy, both 
domestic and foreign, as early as 2008, Evans observed that new Russian reality, albeit 
successful so far, has become an incarnation of a sole man’s worldview. What can help to 
shed light on an incomprehensible, from the West’s perspective, annexation of Crimea, is 
that Putin’s actions have never been ‘ad hoc responses to immediate conditions’ (p.901), 
but part of a clear-cut, viable strategic vision, which may be summed up as ‘Great 
Russia’. In order to be viable to a domestic audience, this vision has to be replete with 
symbolism of successive concrete gestures. Irrespective of substantial repercussions, the 
Sochi 2014 Olympic Games as well as the Crimean gambit could not fit Putin’s plan 
better. In the eyes of Putin these two events, reinforcing one another, is what both 
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represents and lays the ground for ‘basic national values and tasks’ (Putin, 2003), and 
thus helps overcome societal and class divisions. 
 
On the one hand, endorsement of insurgents and the annexation of Crimea put an 
end to the discourse of Russia as a normal great power, unraveling the inconsistency of 
government policies. On the other hand, it may be argued, that Russia only lived up to its 
demonized image prevalent in the West. Apparently acting against its own soft power 
interests, among other things, was largely instigated by the constant neglect of Russian 
opinions on global strategic issues, such as NATO enlargement, the Transnistria conflict, 
missile defense development in Europe and global democracy promotion through 
unconstitutional government changes, to name but a few (Tsygankov, 2014).  The same 
holds for offsetting the Russian energy interests in the Caspian area and rejecting any 
potential partnerships2 
 
What Ickes and Gaddy represent as the ‘missing quadrant’ was being filled in: a 
strong but ‘bad’ Russia, not the weak and good Russia of the 1990s, the weak and bad 
Russia presented by its critics, or the good and strong Russia extolled by its friends. 
(Sakwa, 2015) 
 
The unwillingness of Western elites to find common ground and a way for 
Russian integration, let alone accept its claims for a great power status, logically led to an 
escalation of existential and security concerns and ensuing assertive neo-revisionist 
behavior. Ascendancy of neo-revisionism was further bolstered by the so-called color 
revolutions in Ukraine in 2004 and Georgia in 2003, the core inspirations of which was 
Russia as an irreconcilable enemy, the core inspirations of which was Russia as an 
irreconcilable enemy, as an ‘irrelevant other’ to be dissociated with and broken away 
from at all costs. 
Russian foreign policy after the Sochi Olympics, as it currently is, might for a 
long time to come invalidate the Western-oriented soft power discourse, or an approach 
that even remotely resembles Nye’s initial concept, even if subject to Russian 
interpretation. Having been at the crossroads of embracing international engagement or 
                                                 
2 For example, the Nabucco pipeline pulling Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into the orbit of Western influence 
(Tsygankov, 2014). 
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‘hegemonic order’ or ‘veering towards outright revisionism’ (Sakwa, 2011, p. 968), 
Russia seems to have made up its mind in favor of the latter. What this implies for 
Russian soft power aspirations is that if they are not to give way to unrestrained hard 
power politics altogether, they are bound to change the vector to the Islamic World, 
epitomized in the resumption of the Iran-Russian nuclear cooperation, with a radical 
change in rhetoric respectively: 
 
Russia would once again run the danger of becoming the core of the renewed 
‘third-world’ revisionist front, aligned with some of the Islamic world’s critique of 
Western values, an outcome that the country’s  Eurocentric elites sought to avoid (Sakwa, 
2011, p. 968). 
In that way, Russia has always followed what Tsygankov (2009, 351) refers to as 
a sort of alternative soft power project, which is developing both within and outside the 
legitimatizing language of democracy. The difference between pre-Sochi and post-Sochi 
soft power discourse will lie in the evolution of the language from the democratic (at least 
on the surface) to the not so democratic.  
 
There is a view, however, that instead of compensating for a lack of soft power, 
Russian use of force may indeed unprecedentedly add up to its soft power. What is more, 
Russia by no means is trying to charm the West anymore and, indeed its neo-revisionist 
behavior will have further consequences. However, its condemnation ‘of the decay of 
liberal world order, the West’s double standards in application of international law, and 
its ostensibly weakening moral authority’ (Lankina and Niemczyk, 2014) certainly 
expresses the view of a large number of the population globally, and championed by 
Russia and the charismatic Putin will assert its influence even though it may not be the 
type of soft power as articulated by Nye. The conflict in Ukraine, as such, is an example 
of the tensions which arise not because Russian soft power is weak, but because the 
regions where it is strong are not allowed sufficient self-expression and self-
representation. 
 
Even though Putin initially looked for opportunities for closer cooperation with 
the EU and the USA, it is maintained that it was done not out of a desire for institutional 
and political integration, but exclusively as a pursuit of national economic interest and 
political realism, albeit not charged with ideological ‘grand designs’ (Lavrov, 2007, p.8) 
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or ‘missionary functions’ (Putin, 2007). This would not have been inconsistent, however, 
with ‘realism with a strong dose of ideology’ (Caldwell, 2007) that marked Russian 
foreign diplomacy for centuries. Evans argues that Putin was fully aware of the pitfalls of 
radical ideology, such as a possibility of a resumption of an ideological struggle with the 
West, which the head of state believed to be outright disadvantageous for Russia. Evans 
duly pointed out that the rise and nature of a new Russian ideology, as well as ensuing 
political moves, depends upon the Kremlin to the same extent as they depend upon the 
eagerness of its Western counterparts either to engage with Russia on equal terms or 
continue to treat it as an inferior partner (910). The Sochi Olympics, however, 
symbolically marked a watershed moment both in world politics and Russian national 
identity ambitions. 
 
Sports Mega events as Building Blocks for a New Russian National Idea 
Apart from dealing with a number of common challenges every dictatorship 
encounters on the way to democracy (e.g. economic reforms and transition to pluralism) 
Russia came across a rather more fundamental problem of a formation of a viable 
national idea to glue together a multi-ethnic state, reflect and inspire a transformation of 
consciousness, and light up a vision of a worthwhile collective future (Sperling, 2013; 
Sakwa, 2011; Tsygankov, 2009). The reason behind the demise of a coherent unifying 
national idea for millions of Russian citizens lies in their disillusionment with the inflated 
Communist ideology, which has kept a Soviet Utopia alive for more than seventy years. 
Although considered by Putin and a large proportion of the multi-ethnic Eurasian 
population as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, the Soviet Union could 
not evade a humiliating defeat and fragmentation. It is evident that a formulation of a 
national idea in Russia is yet to take place, something that is holding up the nation-
building process (Tolz, 1998). An emergent Russian national idea will essentially be 
rooted in its history, the mentality of its citizens and elite, and will be bound to assume 
features of the political regimes which have shaped the country over the course of time 
(Laruelle, 2012; Rutland, 2012). The central feature pertaining to the ideology formation 
process in the newly established democracies is an equal possibility of swaying into 
either ethnic exclusionism, of which an inflated sense of patriotism is an example, or 
towards civic liberalism with corresponding consequences for the country and 
geostrategic realities (Sperling, 2003). 
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The use of military vocabulary in the context of the Olympics demonstrates an 
interesting paradox. Outwardly, that is to the Western onlooker, Russia wants to appear a 
benign and responsible, though strong and ambitious, agent in international relations, 
committed to soft power ideals. Inwardly, that is, to the domestic audience, Russia sends 
a message which is meant to ignite a certain hostility against an outside world and to 
juxtapose ‘us against them’ and thus to use the West as a dissociative group in this 
identity building enterprise. An attempt to evoke a war-like patriotism is also grounded in 
the absence of other potent unifying memories apart from victory in World War II, which 
could arouse pride and be credible to a multi-ethnic, multimillion nation. 
 
The year after the Sochi Olympics Russia was characterised by what Makarychev 
and Yatsyk (2015, 67) see as a ‘dominating trend towards an increasingly more 
pronounced imperial identity and its Anti-Western reverberations’. It did not happen out 
of the blue, however. As far back as 2007 the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ started to 
feature in official rhetoric as a model with alleged global soft power potential, similar to 
the Beijing consensus based on economic success and a centralized state, considering that 
the Western liberal democracy is imperfect and not universally applicable (Polyakov, 
2007; Evans, 2008). Undoubtedly, any sort of Russian soft power promotion or such 
concrete projects as sports mega-events would have been impossible without the presence 
‘of a relatively coherent, emotionally charged, and conceptually interlocking, set of ideas’ 
(Hunt, 1987, p.15), which constitute an ideology. The ideology of contemporary Russia 
dates back to the coining of the notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ by Vladislav Surkov in 
2006. 
This concept as such implies that instead of mechanically copying other countries 
‘experiences’ (Putin, 2007) there is an inalienable right of a nation-state to define not 
only their contours and foreign policy, but also to independently establish the foundations 
of its own national identity (Putin, 2005) and henceforth envisaged future. In this respect, 
the Sochi Olympics were expected to provide the Russian people with a future-looking 
national symbol. They were to become a point of reference for a new Putin-ruled 
generation of people, a reinvigorating milestone for the new glorious national identity.  
Although born out of the heroics of the WWII, space explorations, world-class culture 
and cutting-edge science, this identity depreciated in the turmoil of the 1990s and has 
little relevance for the youth of the 21st century. In this respect, sports mega-events are to 
deal with the pervasive habit of historical self-referencing. In more pragmatic terms, 
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‘Putinism’ as an ideology is based on a negation of the 1990s, while continuing its 
fundamental projects: ‘marketisation, democratization, and international integration’ 
(Sakwa, 2011, p.961). 
 
Obvious contradictions in this new ideology may be put down to Putin’s 
propensity to accommodate deeply conflicting visions of Russian identity, that is of the 
Westernisers and Easternisers (Laruelle, 2012; Tsygankov, 2007), the primary concern of 
which are integration vs national autonomy, democracy vs sovereignty, ideology vs 
pragmatism. Not logically justified from the West’s perspective, the Kremlin’s policy 
towards Ukraine is, nevertherless, in perfect compliance with domestic civilisational 
discourse, in particular with the Expansionists view that Russia ‘is powerful enough to 
deploy its soft power coercively and without regard for the ex-republics desire to develop 
relationships with the European Union and the United States’ (Tsygankov, 2009, p.356). 
 
This paradigmatic dichotomy, in addition to exogenous factors, is identified by 
Sakwa (2011) as a stumbling block on Russia’s road to a fully-fledged international 
integration and what precludes it from occupying an acceptable place in the hierarchy of 
nations. He, therefore, assigns a central role to establishing a compromise between an 
international integration and a strong state with a new symbiotic national identity. 
 
Conclusion 
In this piece we argued that the Kremlin forefronted the domestic over the 
international dimension in its SME soft power strategy. The vast majority of SME soft 
power strategies are outward looking and intended to help the host ‘emerge’ in terms of 
economic and political development. Russia did not use the SME in the same manner as 
most other states, emerging or otherwise. Instead, the Sochi Olympic Games and 
subsequent annexation of Crimea, while exemplifying the application of both soft and 
hard power respectively (Nye’s so-called ‘smart power’), were an attempt to lend a 
forward-looking dimension to a traditionally backward-looking, nostalgic Soviet-era and 
imperialist-rooted national identity discourse. It seems the domestic soft power project 
has succeeded so far, given the improvement of Putin’s approval ratings from 54 per cent 
in 2013 (Ray, 2014), to 75 per cent just after the Olympics (RT.com) and an 
extraordinary 86 per cent in February 2015 (Saeed, 2015). Equally, Sochi ought to be 
understood as part of a wider strategy of urban regeneration and restructuring. The vast 
18 
 18 
majority of SME soft power strategies are outward looking and intended to help the host 
boost their international prestige. The Russian case appears different with an emphasis on 
a domestic audience. There also appears to be signs of the mobilization of a Russian 
national consciousness and self-identification. It remains to be seen whether the arising 
ideology becomes a resuscitating inspiration for the nation or a spiritual straightjacket or 
developmental trap.  As for the international aspect, Joseph Nye (2014) made it clear that 
not only did Russia fail to capitalize on the Sochi Olympics as a source of soft power, its 
ultimate interpretation of the concept has little to do with what he initially envisaged.  
 
As we have attempted to show, such an assessment is too ‘Western’; that is, it 
does not allow for alternative views of Russia’s strategy. For example, Lankina and 
Niemczyk (2014) suggest that the West runs the risk of underestimating the sources and 
reach of Russian attractiveness to others. Russian soft power is not meant for people not 
already sharing ethnic or cultural ties with Russia. That is, it is neither expansionist nor 
an aggressive imperialist idea, bent on subduing cultures and communities in order to 
integrate them into multifaceted Russian civilization, nor is it a cosmopolitan evangelism 
for Soviet people. Moreover, despite a visible blow the Russian economy suffered as a 
result of sanctions and a depreciating currency, it still remains the most influential among 
the post-Soviet states, being thus far indispensable for its neighbours. 
 
While some argue that Putin’s decisions will be fatal for his authoritarian neo-
revisionist system in the long run, there is a growing understanding that Putin’s actions 
could have been defensive rather than offensive (Sakwa, 2015; Tsygankov, 2014). It is 
the so called ‘war to stop NATO enlargement’ - an issue that has been the most 
inflammatory bone of contention between Moscow and Washington ever since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Continuously ignoring the Kremlin’s pleas to stop the 
block’s advancement, Russia believes that the West had its way, thus legitimately raising 
the Kremlin’s security concerns and testing Putin’s temper to its limits. Therefore, 
prognoses of Putin’s system’s imminent dissolution may be a little hasty without an in-
depth understanding of the peculiarities and dynamics of Russian public thought, which 
historically defy analogy with any Western case. One thing is clear for now: the conflict 
in Ukraine challenges the essence and sustainability of the Kremlin’s international soft 
power proposition, and its recovery would require strategic actions. The outcome of the 
Ukrainian affair, which became a fully-fledged civilizational contest between Atlantisim 
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and Eurasianism, liberal democracy and authoritarianism, will largely define Russian soft 
power and great power ambitions and prospects for a long time to come. 
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